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A State's Duty to Prevent and Respond to Cyberterrorist
Acts
Christopher E. Lentz*

Cyberterrorism combines two of the most prominent developments of the last twentyyears:
the increasing reliance on the internet's infrastructure,and the threat of internationalterrorism
committed by non-state actors. Although multilateraltreaties aim to shore up some aspects of
gcbercrime, and the Security Council has taken steps towards preventing terrorist acts,
international law appears to lack a cohesive approach for dealing with situations where
gyberspace and terrorism overlap. This Comment proposes one such approachfor tackling the
emergentproblem of gcberterrorism.
International law has yet to articulate a satisfactory prohibition on, or definition of,
"terrorism." Instead, internationalagreements ban pecific acts as inherently terrorist,although
none of these bans clearly encompass cyberacts. While these agreements can be dispositive, the
Security Council revealed its willingness after September 11 to identify, on an ad hoc basis,
"terroristacts." The Security Council then wrote Resolution 1373 in a way that created an
internationalduoy that commands all states to prevent and respond to terrorist acts. This
Resolution should be interpretedto recognize a similarduty on all states to prevent and respond
to gcberterroristacts, whenever the are identified as such. Recognizing this duty willprobably
lead to negligible changes in states'preventativeacts, but it should establish a fundamental and
reasonable responsibility on states to cooperate in response to the inevitable gberterroristact.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyberattacks are at the forefront of international conflict. Estonia learned
this in 2007 when its "paperless government" faced an extended cyberattack
after upsetting Russia.' Estonia initially claimed that Russia had directed these

I

BA 2003, Tufts University;JD 2009, The University of Chicago Law School.
See The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia, BBC News (May 17, 2007),

online

at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/6665195.stm (visited Nov 21, 2009) (reporting that
Estonia's defence ministry compared these cyberattacks to "terrorist activities").
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attacks but later seemed to withdraw this claim, 2 possibly because of the
inherent difficulty of demonstrating the attacks were state, or state-sponsored,
action. Instead, Estonia published a list of IP addresses, mostly located in
Russian territory, from where it believed the cyberattacks emanated.3 The
following year, it appeared this pattern started to repeat itself when Georgia
became the newest target of alleged Russian hackers responding to actual
fighting between the two states.4
These cyberattacks against Estonia and Georgia appear to confirm that
individuals are capable of utilizing the internet to harass states. What will happen
when cyberharassment inevitably grows into cyberterrorism on a catastrophic
scale? The victim states will surely strive to identify their attackers, and might
calibrate their responses accordingly. But this identification will almost certainly
require the cooperation of other states, including the state from where the attack
originated. Such cooperation, though, may not be forthcoming merely as a
matter of compassion. Instead, states might only acquiesce in providing
assistance if obligated through an international law duty.5
But international law currently recognizes no such duty as incumbent on all
states. Despite the wave of cyberterrorism that seems poised to threaten world
security, international law has yet to solidify an appropriate response

2

3

Compare Estonia Hit By Moscow Cyber War, BBC News (May 17, 2007), online at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6665145.stm (visited Nov 21, 2009) ("Estonia says
the country's websites have been under heavy attack for the past three weeks, blaming Russia for
playing a part in the cyber warfare.") with BBC News, The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia (cited in
note 1) ("[T]he government in Tallinn has not blamed the Russian authorities directly for the
attacks.").
BBC News, The yber Raiders Hitting Estonia (cited in note 1) (stating that these IP addresses
included some "in the Russian government and presidential administration").

4

Consider Neil Arun, Caucasus Foes Fight Cyber War, BBC News (Aug 14, 2008), online at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7559850.stm (visited Nov 21, 2009) (reporting,
ominously, the opinion of internet security experts who claimed "it was inevitable that... [such a
conflict] should spill into cyberspace').

5

States do not always observe their international law duties, of course. But recognizing these duties
is a prerequisite for recognizing when a state has breached them. See International Law
Commission, DraftArticles on the ResponsibiliLy of Statesfor InternationallyWrongfulActs, Art 12, [2001]
Vol II (Part Two) YB Intl L Commn 26, UN Doc A/56/10 ("There is a breach of an
international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is
required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character.') This, in turn, helps to
determine when an injured state may lawfully employ countermeasures to force the breaching
state to fulfill its obligations. See id at Art 49(1) (offering the limits of countermeasures). This
Comment focuses on international law, not on how states will respond to this law. The realist
critique of international law may be an important one, but responding to it is not within this
Comment's purview.
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mechanism. 6 This Comment aims to advance one possible means to help states
collectively withstand the ominous threat of cyberterrorist attacks.
Sections II.A. and II.B address international law's inability to formulate a
workable prohibition on terrorism, leading to a focus on terrorist acts. Section
II.C demonstrates that especially egregious acts can be defined as "terrorist"
after they occur, and it introduces Security Council Resolution 1373, which
creates binding duties upon all states to prevent and respond to "terrorist acts."
Section III looks at cyberterrorist acts from a victim state's perspective, showing
that state cooperation will be essential for identifying the perpetrators. It also
points out that attributing cyberterrorist acts to other states will be practically
impossible, thereby calling for a solution that obliges states to play a role in the
realm of cyberterrorism. Section IV proposes interpreting Resolution 1373 to
recognize an international law duty for states to prevent or respond to any
cyberterrorist act. Because of issues defining cyberacts as "terrorist," the
forward-looking duty to prevent cyberterrorist acts will have minimal practical
effect. But there will be no definitional dilemma for the backward-looking duty
to respond. When triggered, this latter duty entails reasonable obligations to
cooperate in criminal investigations and to arrest, and prosecute or extradite, an
alleged cyberterrorist actor.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW'S Focus ON TERRORIST ACTS
Questions regarding cyberterrorism might prove relatively easy to resolve if
international law were more settled regarding traditional forms of terrorism.
International law, however, has not grappled successfully with terrorism. Section
II.A concludes that terrorism has yet to be proscribed by a universally agreedupon jus cogens norm, so that there is no such norm that could be expanded to
cover novel forms of terrorism. Section II.B observes that there is not even
agreement on how to define "terrorism," which has necessitated an ad hoc
system that bans certain types of acts considered to be inherently terroristic. The
focus on "terrorist acts" is considered further in Section II.C, which looks at the
international response to the September 11 attacks in order to identify
international law duties and corollaries to cyberterrorist acts.

6

See, for example, Jon P. Jurich, Development: Cyberwarand Customary InternationalLaw: The Potentialof
a ' ottom-up"Approach to an InternationalLawof Information Operations, 9 Chi J nd L 275, 295 (2008)
(concluding that "existing law seems unable to cope with the potential harms presented by
[offensive or defensive cyberactions]").
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A. Problems Concluding That Jus Cogens Proscribe Terrorism
Jus cogens-sometimes referred to as "peremptory norms"-are absolute
rules that affirm the lawful conduct of all states.7 The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) defines them as "a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted." 8 As such, they are considered laws
themselves, rather than sources of law. The actual sources ofjus cogens norms,
though, are in dispute. "The source of peremptory norms has been variously
attributed to state consent, natural law, necessity, international public order, and
the development of constitutional principles." 9 This lack of agreement on jus
cogens' ethereal origins is largely irrelevant, however, if there is consensus on the
substantive content of the norms.
Unfortunately, no such consensus exists. It seems that "[t]he most obvious
and best settled rules of jus cogens ...[include] trade in slaves, piracy or
genocide," although other areas are not quite as settled.'" A laundry list of more
controversial norms has also been put forth as worthy ofjus cogens recognition,
including "all human rights, all humanitarian norms[,] ...the duty not to cause
transboundary environmental harm, freedom from torture, the duty to
assassinate dictators, the right to life of animals, self-determination, the right to
development, free trade, [] territorial sovereignty [and] the invalidity of treaties
that conflicted with" Soviet ideas of transnational law,"
Most pertinent here, it is still disputed whether jus cogens prohibit
terrorism. 12 For example, the American Law Institute listed "offenses recognized
by the community of nations as of universal concern" to include "piracy, slave
trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, andperhapscertain
7

8

See Barry E. Carter, Phillip R. Trimble, and Allen S. Weiner, InternationalLaw 120 (Aspen 5th ed
2007) (observing that they are "so fundamental that they bind all states').
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Art 53, 1155 UN Treaty Ser 331 (continuing
thatjus cogens norms "can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character").

9

10

n
12

Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in InternationalLaw, 100 Am J Intl L 291, 302 (2006) (reaching
this conclusion after surveying various sources).
International Law Commission, DraftArlicles on the Law of Trealies with Commentaries, [1966] Vol II
YB Ind L Commn 187, 248 (revealing that the International Law Commission intentionally
excluded examples of jus cogens norms in order to prevent the resulting treaty from being
interpreted based on its omissions, and to avoid becoming embroiled in an ongoing dispute over
addingjus cogens norms that are more controversial).
Shelton, 100 Am J Ind L at 303 (cited in note 9) (concluding that "the literature has abounded in
claims that additional international norms constitutejus cogens").
This remains true even if there is no dispute over how to identify "terrorism." This issue is
addressed, but not resolved, in Section II.B.
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acts of terrorism."' 13 This equivocation highlights that ajus cogens norm falls short
of the Vienna Convention's requirement that the norm be "accepted and
recognized by the international community of States."
In addition, although many postulate that a prohibition on terrorism
exists, 14 numerous states still engage in some form of terrorism. 5 This calls into
question whether the proposed prohibition meets the Vienna Convention's
additional condition that the norm be one "from which no derogation is
permitted." State participation in terrorism further weakens the argument that a
universal terrorism prohibition has been established already.' 6
The disagreement over whetherjus cogens proscribe terrorism, coupled with
state practice in support of terrorism, militates against deciding conclusively that
such a proscription exists. Thus, this Comment cannot take a generalized ban on
terrorism and broaden it to include cyberterrorism. As a result, this Comment
operates under the assumption that a jus cogens norm prohibiting terrorism has
yet to crystallize fully. It looks elsewhere for a state's duty pertaining to
cyberterrorism.
B. Problems Defining "Terrorism" Lead to Proscriptions of
Terrorist Acts
After jus cogens, the next place to look for an international law ban on
terrorism is at the global regime created by the United Nations (UN). The UN
has succeeded in roundly condemning "terrorism," even before the galvanizing
attacks on September 11.17 Despite these agreements, the UN and the
13
14

15

16

17

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 404 (1987) (emphasis added) (listing when
universal jurisdiction exists for a state to define and punish an offense).
See, for example, Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Teree E. Foster, More Speech, Less Noise:
Ampifying Content-basedSpeech Regulations Through Binding InternationalLaw, 18 BC Intl & Comp L
Rev 59, 100-01 (1995) (identifying the prohibition on terrorism as a jus cogens norm that is
"[lMargely [u]ndisputed').
See, for example, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law at § 404 cmt a (cited in note 13)
("There has been wide condemnation of terrorism, but international agreements to punish it have
not, as of 1987, been widely adhered to.").
See Christos L. Rozakis, The Concept ofJus Cogens in the Law of Treaties 77-80 (North-Holland 1976)
(focusing on the Vienna Convention's language "as a whole" and on the drafting history behind
Article 53 to conclude that "the existence of contrary practice by a number of States weakens the
evidential position of that norm").
See, for example, Resolution 1269, UN Security Council, 4053d mtg (Oct 19, 1999), UN Doc
S/RES/1269
1 ("condemn[ing] all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and
unjustifiable'); Resolution 49/60, UN General Assembly, 49th Sess (Dec 9, 1994), UN Doc
A/RES/49/60 (Feb 17, 1995)
4 ('uq[ing] States ...to take all appropriate measures ... to
eliminate terrorism'); Resolution 2625 (XXV), UN General Assembly, 25th Sess (Oct 24, 1970),
UN Doc A/8018 122-23 C(prodaim[inA" the principle that "[e]very State has the duty to refrain
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international community as a whole have failed to define this elusive concept. 8
Although this failure arises partly from geopolitics, it stems also from the
commonly held belief that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom
fighter."' 9 This prevents universal agreement on who constitutes a terrorist,
thereby precluding agreement on what constitutes terrorism.
Instead of defining "terrorism," the UN has forged agreements that
proscribe acts associated with terrorism. 20 To date, thirteen international
instruments have taken aim at such acts. These include conventions proscribing
aircraft hijackings, aviation sabotage, hostage taking, and the unlawful theft and
use of nuclear material.2 It is worth noting that none of these conventions
clearly relates to cyberterrorism.2 2
These thirteen instruments represent the international community's
greatest successes in consensus-building against terrorist acts. But they ban only
acts associated with terrorism, not terrorism itself. As a result, there is no clear
treaty-based proscription of terrorism, much like there is no clear jus cogens
prohibition of terrorism, which can be elucidated and expanded upon. Only a
specific act that is deemed "terrorist" will trigger any international law duty
associated with terrorism. This becomes important when considering the duties
created by the Security Council after the September 11 attacks.
C. September 11 and Security Council Resolution 1373
On September 11, 2001, terrorists shocked the world by hijacking four
commercial airplanes and turning them into oversized missiles. Two planes
crashed into the World Trade Center, precipitating its collapse. One plane flew

19

from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in ... terrorist acts in another State or
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such
acts, when the acts ... involve a threat or use of force").
See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law at § 404 cmt a (cited in note 13) (noting the
international community's "inability to agree on a definition of the offense").
See, for example, Alison Elizabeth Chase, Legal Mechanisms of the International Communiy and the

18

20

United States Concerning State Sponsorship of Terrorism,45 Va J Ind L 41, 93-96 (2004) (recording this
belief as one reason why there has been no international agreement defining "terrorism").
See id at 95 (making this observation).

21

See Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, InternationalCounter-TerrorismInstruments

22

(UN
Dept
Pub
Info
2006)
1-3,
online
at
http://www.un.org/terrorism/
pdfs/bgnotejlegaLinstruments.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009) (discussing the thirteen conventions).
The other nine conventions cover in-flight safety, violence at international airports, terrorist
activities on ships and on fixed offshore platforms, attacks on high-ranking government officials
or diplomats, marking plastic explosives for identification, bombings in public places, financing of
terrorism, and acts of nuclear terrorism. See id at 3-5.
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into the Pentagon, and passengers grounded the fourth plane on its way to
Washington, DC.23
Few doubted that this amounted to terrorist action. The very next day, the
Security Council passed Resolution 1368, condemning "the horrifying terrorist
attacks" and announcing that it "regard[ej such acts, like any act of international
terrorism, as a threat to peace and security."2 4 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the
Security Council simply labeled these actions as "terrorist attacks." It did not
bother to support this assertion by pointing to conventions on aircraft
hijackings, aviation sabotage, or other potentially related fields.2" It just labeled
them "terrorist attacks," and moved on to more contentious issues. The General
Assembly did exactly the same.26
This pattern of events permits two conclusions to be drawn that are
particularly relevant to this Comment. First, the resolution focused on
"acts ...of international terrorism," rather than on undefined terrorism.27 This
further denied a general, expandable prohibition on terrorism, prolonging the
need to identify terrorist acts. Second, and of greater significance, is the
realization that the Security Council is capable of immediately recognizing the
worst terrorist acts as such. 28 Because the Security Council can promptly identify
when a state has been the victim of a terrorist act, there need be no debate over
definitional issues-at least not in the most extreme examples. It is these
"horrifying" cases that this Comment hopes to address.
The Security Council did not limit its response to the September 12
resolution that offered mere recognition and condemnation. It also passed
Resolution 1373, which has been "[d]escribed as one of the most strongly
worded resolutions in the history of the Security Council. 29 In Resolution 1373,

23

See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission

24

Report 4-14 (Norton 2004).
Resolution 1368, UN Security Council, 4370th mtg (Sept 12, 2001), UN Doc S/RES/1368

25

The Security Council cited only one decree. See id, citing Resolution 1269 at

26

("[C]ondemn[ing] all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable.").
See Resolution 56/1, UN General Assembly, 56th Sess (Sept 12, 2001), UN Doc A/RES/56/1

27

(Sept 18, 2001) ('The General Assemby ... [s]trongly condemns the heinous acts of terrorism [the
previous day].").
Resolution 1368 at 1 (cited in note 24) (emphasis added). Consider also Resolution 56/1 at 1

28

(cited in note 26) (condemning "the heinous acts of terrorism").
Consider Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks 66

29

(Cambridge 2002) (comparing the Security Council's response after September 11 with its more
qualified responses to other attacks, and concluding that "[p]resumably, it is clarity of the facts,
the evidence, and the context that count most in determining systemic reaction").
Alex Conte, SecuiLy in the 21st Centug7: The United Nations,Afghanistan and Iraq 23 (Ashgate 2004).
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the Security Council not only mandated that countries take affirmative steps to
stop the financing of terrorist acts, but it:
Deide[d] also that all States shall:
(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts,
including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of
information;
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit
terrorist acts, or provide safe havens;
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from
using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or
their citizens;
(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning,
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is
brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against
them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in
domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the
seriousness of such terrorist acts; [and]
(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with
criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or
support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their
30
possession necessary for the proceedings.
The word "[d]edde[d]" carries special significance because "[t]he Members of the
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council
in accordance with the [UN] Charter."'" Practically every country in the world is
a UN member, and thus held to the Security Council's decisions. 32 This includes
the decisions announced in Resolution 1373.
Resolution 1373 thus creates an international law duty upon states to take
the steps listed above. In other words, all countries must try to prevent terrorist
acts. But if this fails, all countries must aid by collecting evidence, and must
either prosecute or extradite any perpetrators located within their territory.

30

Resolution 1373, UN Security Council, 4385th mtg (Sept 28, 2001), UN Doc S/RES/1373

31

(specifying eleven steps for all states to take against terrorist acts).
UN Charter Art 25 (emphasis added) (memorializing a central function of the Security Council).

32

One hundred and ninety-two countries are UN members. See United Nations, Member States of the
United Nations, online at http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml (visited Nov 21, 2009) (listing all
192 Member States). This includes all states recognized by the United States, excluding only the
Holy See and Kosovo. See US Department of State, Independent States in the World, online at
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009) (listing 194 states alongside
their UN status). The question of whether Security Council decisions bind non-member states or
non-state entities is outside of this Comment's scope.
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III. CYBERTERRORIST ACTS

The recent experiences of Russia, Estonia, and Georgia demonstrate that
cyberspace can quickly become a battleground in an international dispute.33
Based on these experiences and on the growing importance of the internet to
society, it seems likely that cyberattacks will become more prevalent in the
future. Although the world has witnessed examples of cyberattacks, it has been
relieved thus far from suffering a clear-cut cyberterrorist act.3 4 As such, this
Comment is unable to point to any real-world example of a cyberterrorist act.
But the mere lack of an example should not foreclose the analysis, for law is
often meant to be both backward- and forward-looking. In order to contemplate
the cyberterrorist scenario that exists on the horizon, this Comment explores the
likely conduct of tomorrow's affected, as yet unidentified, states.
Suppose a state-let's call it "Lilliput" for now-is the victim of a
cyberattack so horrific that it directly causes the death of numerous civilians.
Further, suppose that Lilliput has good reason to believe the cyberattack was
launched from a neighboring country-called "Brobdingnag" for the time
being-with which Lilliput has been involved in an ongoing and contentious
row.35 How can, and how should, both Lilliput and Brobdingnag respond to this
cyberattack in a manner consistent with international law?
Lilliput will probably experience two related, kneejerk reactions. On one
hand, it will need to label the attack. Was it an act of crime, an act of terror, or
an act of war? On the other hand, it will want to identify the perpetrators who
initiated the attack. While Lilliput will approach these issues simultaneously, this
Comment can address only one at a time. Section III.A focuses on how to
describe the attack. Although there is no satisfactory definition of
"cyberterrorism" or "cyberterrorist act," this Section illustrates for the reader
what sorts of cyberactions could qualify conceivably under these terms. Section
III.B considers the question of who initiated the attack. Identifying the attacker
will entail numerous investigatory steps, and will probably succeed only if other
states cooperate in the investigation.

33

See Section I (introducing these disputes).

34

Although cyberattacks targeted Estonia and Georgia, see notes 1-4 and accompanying text,
neither of these attacks would qualify as a "cyberterrorist act" under the assumption spelled out in
Section II.A because neither was universally identified as such. Outside the bounds of that
assumption, this Comment takes no stance on whether these cyberattacks actually were
"cyberterrorist acts" under alternate definitions.

35

In Gulliver's Travels, "Lilliput" and "Brobdingnag" represent, respectively, undersized and
oversized nations. See Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels 51, 56, 119, 122-23 (Penguin 1985) (Peter
Dixon and John Chalker, eds). Here, Lilliput and Brobdingnag represent, respectively, the victim
state and the host state.
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Once the attackers have been identified, Lilliput will surely want to
ascertain whether Brobdingnag or any other state had a hand in the cyberattack.
In spite of its suspicions, Lilliput will find it nearly impossible to attribute the
cyberattack to a state because, as Section III.C establishes, state attribution still
requires fulfilling the burdensome "effective control" test. This highlights a gap
in state duties to prevent or respond to a cyberterrorist act, pointing the way
towards the simple proposal discussed in Section IV.
A. Definition
This Comment operates under the assumption that the Security Council
and international community will identify especially horrific cyberattacks as
"terrorist acts." For example, a cyberattack that intentionally caused the Three
Gorges Dam to flood the surrounding Chinese population would presumably be
labeled a "terrorist act.", 36 This assumption is necessary for two reasons. First,
defining "terrorism" has proved so elusive in the concrete world that there is no
basis for believing this Comment can define it as applied to the virtual world.
This Comment cannot hope to succeed where generations of world leaders have
failed. Second, even if this Comment could articulate a workable definition, it
would quickly grow stale given the internet's rapid change and society's
progressive reliance on cyberspace.37 What makes sense today may appear folly
tomorrow. This is not to deny that defining "cyberterrorism" or "cyberterrorist
acts" may be possible in the future, but a workable definition will be more
feasible once the degree of change tapers off a bit.
Assuming away these definitional difficulties does not undermine the
implications of this Comment. True, there will be bickering over whether
specific, mid-level cyberattacks qualify as "terrorist acts." It appears, though, that
no such debate will take place after extreme cyberattacks, especially if they have
salient, real-world effects. The September 11 response shows that the Security
Council and international community are able to identify truly egregious terrorist
36

Such an attack would certainly be catastrophic. "Over 360 million people live within the
watershed of the Yangtze River [which is damned by the Three Gorges Dam]. If the one in one
thousand chance of a dam collapse occurred, the millions of people who live downstream would
be endangered." PBS, Great Wall Across the YangtZe: Facts & Figures, online at
http://www.pbs.org/itvs/greatwall/daml.html (visited Nov 21, 2009). It is difficult to determine
whether a cyberattack against the Three Gorges Dam is technically possible, but it at least seems
feasible. See Xinhuanet, Closure of Sluice Gate at Three Goqes Dam Successful, Xinhua News Agency
Oune 1, 2003), online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-06/01/content_898069.htm
(visited Nov 21, 2009) (reporting that the reservoir's water level had been successfully raised
"through computer-controlled operations" of most of the water diversion holes).

37

"When circumstances are changing, rules are likely to be inaccurate." Cass R. Sunstein, Problems
with Rules, 83 Cal L Rev 953, 1015 (1995) (continuing that under "these circumstances it may be
best ...to allow case-by-case judgments based on relevant factors").
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acts as such, even in previously unseen circumstances. This permits the
assumption that there will always be a similar method, however crude, for all
states to differentiate cyberterrorist acts from other cyberactions, at least in the
most extreme examples.
Still, it may be helpful for this Comment to address some of the
possibilities for identifying a cyberterrorist act. One way would be to create an
agreement that recognizes specific cyberactions as inherently cyberterrorist acts.
Section II.B has shown that certain acts-such as taking hostages-are to be
deemed "terrorist." Although none of these clearly encompasses cyberactions, it
is conceivable that a parallel consensus will emerge that equates specific
cyberactions with terrorist acts. Until this occurs, however, we can only sketch
out a general framework that delineates what sorts of cyberactions might qualify
as "terrorist."
Susan W. Brenner offers one plausible method for how to distinguish
between different cyberactions. She divides cyberactions into three types:
cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and cyberwarfare 8 To her, cybercrime-such as
online harassment, theft, or fraud-consists of "the use of computer
technology.., to engage in activity that threatens a society's ability to maintain
internal order."39 This is the same as cyberterrorism, except for its motive:
"[c]rimes are committed for individual and personal reasons," while "terrorism is
political."4 But if cyberterrorism is political, so too is cyberwarfare. Their
difference lies not in who commits the acts, for she contends that both
individuals and states can engage in cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare.41 Instead,
the distinction is that cyberterrorism specifically targets civilians, whereas
cyberwarfare does not. 42 Putting this all together, one might think of
cyberterrorism as the use of computer technology to target civilians in a way that

38

39
40

41

42

'At Light Speed": Attribution and Response to
Consider Susan W. Brenner,
Cyberciime/Terrotism/Wafare,97 J Crim L & Criminol 376 (2007).
Id at 386 (warning societies to be vigilant of "emerging [online] activities that constitute a threat
to their ability to maintain internal order," and recommending criminalization of such activities).
Id at 387 (recognizing these motives can be conflated, but arguing we must distinguish them
because we should respond to them in different ways); see also Mohammad Iqbal, Defining
Cyberterrorism, 22 John Marshall J Computer & Info L 397, 407-08 (2004) (concluding, after
discussing eight definitions of "cyberterrorism," that "[t]he difference between cyberterrotism and
other cyber attacks, such as hacking and cracking, is that the cyberterrorists are politically
motivated, while other cyber attackers have non-political motives").
See Brenner, 97 J Crim L & Criminol at 404-05 (cited in note 38) (arguing that cyberspace
permits both non-state actors and states to participate in acts of crime, terror, and war).
See id at 387-88.
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threatens society's ability to maintain internal order, when this threat is
intentional and politically motivated.43
How might cyberterrorists achieve this goal? Brenner points out that they
could wield computer technology in three distinct ways: as a weapon of mass
destruction, as a weapon of mass distraction, or as a weapon of mass
disruption.' An example of mass destruction would occur were a cyberterorrist
able to hijack and disable Lilliput's computer system running a nuclear power
plant, causing a devastating nuclear explosion.4" A cyberterrorist attack of mass
distraction, on the other hand, would focus on psychological manipulation of
the Lilliputian public.46 This might be done by, say, programming all internet
news programs to announce the contamination of major water sources, leading
to a national panic. A related, but more subtle attack, centers on mass
disruption, which aims to erode the public's confidence in its infrastructure and
police powers. An example of this might be shutting down a power grid in a
different Lilliputian city for thirty minutes every Monday morning.47 Of these
three types of cyberterrorist attacks, only the first (and perhaps the second) class
of attack will be egregious enough to qualify unequivocally as a horrific act of
terrorism.
B. Investigation, Cooperation, and Identification
Let us return to the example of Lilliput, which has just experienced a
horrific cyberattack. Regardless of whether the attack is ultimately classified as
an act of crime, terror, or war, Lilliputians will no doubt attempt to seek out the
perpetrators. But sophisticated perpetrators would have tried to shield their true
identities, leading to a multileveled game of hide-and-seek between the two
sides. This Comment's scope does not allow an expansion into highly technical
details of computer investigations. It does presume, however, that Lilliput will
succeed in identifying the perpetrators if given sufficient and timely information
by cooperating states.

43

This Comment does not advocate this as a definition, but merely provides it to the reader as one
possible way to think about cyberterrorism. Similarly, the next paragraph contemplates
cyberterrorist acts in a discussion that should not be taken to be conclusive.

44

For this creative terminology, see Brenner, 97 J Crim L & Criminol at 390 (cited in note 38).

45

See id at 390-91. Brenner asserts that although "[t]his is a viable terrorism scenario, ] it is not a
cyberterrorism scenario." Id at 391. She appears to qualify this assertion, however, with the
empirical assumption that "the victims would recall it as a nuclear catastrophe, not as a computer
catastrophe." Id.

46

See id at 391-93.

47

See id at 393-98.
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Lilliput's first step will likely be to examine its own computer networks for
data indicating intrusion or tampering by the cyberattackers. Once found,
Lilliput will trace this data back through various intermediate routers to identify
the router that first sent the data.48 It will then need to examine the router to
determine which network's server precipitated the cyberattack. In this example,
Lilliput has been able to identify the server as being located in Brobdingnag
without having to encroach on Brobdingnag sovereignty.49
Ascertaining that the server is located in Brobdingnag does not end the
analysis. The server acts as a mere staging ground for the attack, and its location
demonstrates only that Brobdingnag territory was used as the launch pad. °
Lilliput will still want to identify who used this server to launch the attack; it may
also wish to determine whether Brobdingnag knew or should have known its
capabilities were being used for staging grounds. To do either, Lilliput will have
to examine the server's network for log files and other data that memorialize the
server's activities and user IP addresses."1 This information, in turn, can point to
the actual location where the attack originated, thereby facilitating the search for
the perpetrators.5 2 Gathering this evidence is highly time-sensitive, for it "might
be erased at any moment" by the server administrator.5 3
48

See Eoghan Casey, DigitalEvidence and Computer Crime: ForensicScience, Computers and the Internet446-

49

48 (Academic 2d ed 2004) (showing that data usually travels from the host computer to the
destination computer through various routers). This presumes, for simplicity's sake, that the
intermediate routers are located within jurisdictions made accessible to Lilliput. Intermediate
routers located in hostile states are addressed briefly in note 85.
The router, of course, could be located in Brobdingnag or in a neighboring country. For ease of

s0

51

52

argument, this example places the router outside of Brobdingnag. Were the router inside
Brobdingnag, it would merely add another layer to the next paragraph's analysis. In that case,
Lilliput might need to encroach lawfully on Brobdingnag's sovereignty to analyze the router that
points to Brobdingnag's possession of the server, and then re-encroach to examine the server's
data.
See Brenner, 97 J Crim L & Criminol at 409-11 (cited in note 38) (observing that we cannot
necessarily equate the launching of an attack by a Chinese server with the launching of an attack
by a Chinese national). See also Demetri Sevastopulo, Chinese Hackers Penetrate White House
Network, Financial Times 7 (Nov 7, 2008) ("A second US official said government cyber experts
had determined that the attacks [on the Obama and McCain campaigns] originated from China,
but he cautioned that they could not determine whether they were related to the government.").
Section IV.B proposes recognizing Brobdingnag's international law duty to secure and provide
this information.
See Casey, Digital Evidence and Comzrputer Crime at 441, 526 (cited in note 48) (offering network
information and guidance on how to investigate computer intrusions). The IP address is
analogous to a home telephone number. An IP address can be altered to throw investigators off
track, but it appears that an "offender can only reconfigure his computer with another IP address
on the same subnet." Id at 445. If this remains true, a cyberterrorist might be able to mask his IP
address (telephone number), but not his subnet (area code). It is also worth noting that IP
addresses are increasingly becoming "dynamic," meaning that they can be assigned to different
users at different times. But the Internet Service Provider (ISP) usually maintains a log showing
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But gathering evidence located in another country can cause problems.
First, Lilliput's domestic law may hamper its ability to search for, and seize,
foreign evidence. This issue arises, for example, when the United States
contemplates foreign searches and faces Fourth Amendment constraints.5 4 Yet
this hardly seems a realistic obstacle for a victim of cyberterrorism; we should
expect our imaginary Lilliput to override any domestic restraints by some legal
or extralegal means."5 A second, more intractable, sovereignty issue also seems
likely to surface: Brobdingnag might assert a proprietary interest in examining
the server located within its physical jurisdiction, thereby preventing Lilliput
from conducting its own investigation. Such an assertion might be intended to
hide Brobdingnag's role in the cyberattack, but Brobdingnag's reasons could also
be more innocent, such as to prevent the transfer of its technology or to extract
something of equal value from Lilliput. Were Brobdingnag to assert a sole right
to inspect its server, this would not only undermine Lihliput's ability to
investigate, but it would also prevent a more objective third-party from analyzing
valuable evidence.
This latter problem is merely one example of the continual conflict
between the principles of national sovereignty and international collaboration.
Thankfully, collaboration appears likely to win out, at least as far as
cyberterrorism is concerned. First, Security Council Resolution 1373 creates a
duty to offer "the greatest measure of assistance" to investigations, "including
assistance in obtaining evidence in [the state's] possession necessary for the
[criminal] proceedings."5 6 This refrain is repeated again in Section IV. But a
second reason exists to believe that the world will see collaboration in this area:
the exponential reliance on computer systems, coupled with increased
globalization, should lead to increased worry about international cyberactions.
This, in turn, should precipitate states to conclude that cooperation is in their
best interest, making multilateral agreement more likely.

which IP addresses were assigned to which users during which times. See id at 455-56 (explaining
that internet cafrs might use dynamic IP addresses for efficiency reasons). These dynamic IP
addresses highlight the necessity of accessing the ISP's log files in order to identify cyberterrorist
actors, for there may be no other way to connect an IP address to its user at the time in question.
53
54

55

56

Id at 526 (discussing investigative pressures).
See Henry J. Perritt, Jr, Jurisdictionin Cyberspace, 41 Vill L Rev 1, 82-90 (1996) (identifying foreign
searches as "[o]ne of the most common electronic search and seizure problems" for the United
States).
Consider Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terrr in the Balance: Securi'y, Libery, and the Courts
15-17 (Oxford 2007) (describing United States history as a demonstration that, in times of
emergency, the executive will relax constitutional standards and the judiciary will defer to this
relaxation).
Resolution 1373 at 2(f) (cited in note 30).
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Cybercrime, for example, has long been of sufficiently prominent concern,
which helps explain why the UN has been toiling towards a cybercrime
resolution for over fifteen years.5 7 Although the UN has yet to succeed in this
task, the Council of Europe has gotten the ball rolling towards universal
agreement. Its Convention on Cybercrime-which institutes a system for
multistate cooperation in securing and providing data relevant to a recognized
cybercrimeS 5 -is a shining example of international state cooperation. The
Convention has forty-six state signatories, including the non-European countries
of Canada, Japan, South Africa, and the United States. 9 This Convention's
success holds promise for future multilateral treaties that promote international
investigations over other cyberactions, including acts of cyberterrorism.
Unlike cybercrime, cyberterrorism is a fairly novel development that the
world has yet to consider comprehensively. Among the host of issues to be
resolved is how to ensure international cooperation between future
Brobdingnags and Lilliputs. Without such cooperation, it may be legally
impossible to collect the evidence necessary to identify the attack's
perpetrators.6 ° Section IV proposes the recognition of an international law duty
that is adequate to guarantee efficient and effective investigation of international
cyberterrorist acts. With such a duty recognized by international law and
honored by states, Lilliput should be able to identify the perpetrators.
C. Attribution and Its Impossibly High Hurdle
Once Lilliput succeeds in identifying the cyberterrorists, it will no doubt
attempt to ascertain whether they were acting alone or on behalf of Brobdingnag
(or another state). This is a complicated process, but how the world resolves this
issue could have serious repercussions. If Lilliput can demonstrate that the
cyberattackers acted as agents of Brobdingnag, this would turn the attacks
themselves into Brobdingnag state action. Would this constitute an "armed

57

58

59

60

See Susan W. Brenner and Joseph J. Schwerha IV, Transnational Evidence Gatheting and Local
Prosecution of InternationalCbercime,20 John Marshall J Computer & Info L 347, 363 (2002) (stating
in 2002 that "[t]he United Nations has been working towards resolving the problems raised by
cybercrime for more than a decade").
See Convention on Cybercrime (2001), Arts 15-21, 23, 25, 27, 41 ILM 282 (2001).
See
Council
of
Europe,
Convention
on
Cybercrime,
online
at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT= 185&CM=8&DF=&CL=EN
G (visited Nov 21, 2009) (showing that the Convention has already entered into force in half of
these forty-six countries).
See Brenner and Schwerha, 20 John Marshall J Computer & Info L at 395 (cited in note 57)
(stating that "[i]nternational cooperative efforts among law enforcement personnel will be
essential" for acquiring evidence held in a foreign land).
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attack," thereby triggering Lilliput's inherent right to engage in self-defense?6
Answering this question conclusively is outside of this Comment's scope, but it
seems likely that a Brobdingnag-controlled cyberattack would activate Lilliput's
self-defense right, possibly sparking an armed conflict between the two states.
This issue, though, quickly becomes a moot point. Even if Lilliput can
show that the cyberattack originated within Brobdingnag territory, attributing
the cyberterrorists' acts to the state of Brobdingnag will prove near-impossible.
For one thing, it could well be that the Brobdingnag government is innocent of
having any knowledge of, or ties to, the cyberterrorists. In such a case, it would
be factually and legally incorrect to attribute the cyberattacks to Brobdingnag.
For another thing, the "effective control" test for attribution presents a high
hurdle that is exceedingly difficult for any state to leap over.
The International Court of Justice (Icj) first stated the "effective control"
test for state attribution in the Nicaraguacase,6 2 in which Nicaragua accused the
United States of directing the Contras' paramilitary activities in and against
Nicaragua.63 "For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United
States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective controlof
the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged
violations were committed." 6 4 No definition of "effective control" was
forthcoming but, applied to the facts of the case, it required something more than
"financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the [attackers], the
selection of [their] targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation'"6" This
presents a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to establishing state attribution in
any case lacking a smoking gun.
The effective control test has not existed free of challenges to its
overbearing standard. Most notably, the Appeals Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Appeals Chamber) announced a
lower standard for hierarchically structured groups like paramilitaries, where "the
group as a whole [must be shown to] be under the overall control of the State. 66
The Appeals Chamber also recognized a different test for "a single private
61

Consider UN Charter Art 51 (recognizing a state's inherent right to defend itself in response to an
"armed attack").

62

Military and ParamilitaryActivities(Nicaragua v United States), 1986 ICJ 14 (June 27, 1986).

63

Id at 21-22 (laying out Nicaragua's claims).

64

Id at 65 (emphasis added).

65

Id at 64 ("All the forms of United States participation mentioned, and even the general control by
the respondent State over a force with a high degree of dependency on it, would not in
themselves mean, without further evidence, that the United States directed or enforced the
perpetration of the acts.").
Prosecutorv TadW, Case 94-1-A, 49 (CTY App Chamber 1999) (emphasis added) (distinguishing

66

between structured groups and individuals).
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individual or a group that is not militarily organised': whether the state specifically
instructed the perpetrator to commit the act in question, or whether the state
responded to the act by offering its public endorsement or approval.67
Regardless of whether the cyberterrorist is classified as a structured group, an
unstructured group, or as a private individual, the Appeals Chamber's test
appears to be more achievable than the ICJ's effective control test. But despite
international respect for the Appeals Chamber, the ICJ's decision probably
carries more precedential weight. 68
The International Law Commission (ILC)-a long-standing subsidiary
organ of the UN General Assembly 6 9-also stepped into the fray when it
released its Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles).70 In doing so, the ILC opted to codify the ICJ's
effective control test, while rejecting the Appeals Chamber's lesser, overall
control standard." True, the Draft Articles have yet to be accepted as binding
international law.72 But the decision to adopt the effective control test was not
made lightly, as the Draft Articles were nearly forty years in the making. 3 This,
combined with the ICJ's decision, leads this Comment to recognize "effective
control" as the contemporary test for state attribution.
The prevailing standard of "effective control" poses such a high hurdle for
attacks that it seems unlikely that Lilliput could ever attribute a cyberattack to
Brobdingnag or any other state.74 International law on attribution might catch
67

Id at 58-59 (presenting its holding on the law of state attribution).

68
69

Consider UN Charter Art 92 ("The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations.").
See Resolution 174, UN General Assembly, 123d mtg (Nov 21, 1947), UN Doc 174 (I) 105

70

(establishing the ILC in 1947); UN, Subsidiay Organs of the General Assembly, online at
http://www.un.org/ga/commissions.shtml (visited Nov 21, 2009) (listing the ILC as a subsidiary
organ).
See International Law Commission, Draft Arices on the Responsibiliy of States for Internationaly

71

WrongfulActs at Art 12 (cited in note 5).
Id at Art 8 (attributing conduct to a country if the perpetrators are "in fact acting on the

72

instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct"). The
Commentaries to the Draft Articles "also embrace the Nicaragua effective control standard and
reject the Tadi, overall control standard." Chase, 45 VaJ Intl L at 116 (cited in note 19).
See Resolution 56/83, UN General Assembly, 56th Sess (Dec 12, 2001), UN Doc A/RES/56/83
3 (Jan 28, 2002) ('Tak[ing7 note of the articles ... and commend[ing] them to the attention of
Governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate
action.'".

73

See Chase, 45 Va J Intl L at 112 & n 382 (cited in note 19) (giving this time span).

74

For the difficulty of meeting this standard, see Militag and ParamilitayActiviies, 1986 ICJ at 65
(cited in note 62) (failing to hold the United States responsible for the Contras' actions in
Nicaragua despite numerous substantive links). For a statement about the difficulty experts face in
attributing a cyberartack to a state, see Sevastopulo, Chinese Hackers Penetrate White House Network,
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up to these recent developments by lowering the standard for attributing
conduct to a state."5 In the meantime, however, another avenue should be
considered for curtailing cyberterrorist acts.
IV. RECOGNIZE THE DUTY TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO
CYBERTERRORIST ACTS
International law should recognize that states have a duty to prevent and
respond to cyberterrorist acts. Security Council Resolution 1373 created a similar
duty regarding terrorist acts, and this should be expanded into the frontier of
cyberspace. There will remain definitional disputes over what cyberacts qualify
as "terrorist," but this should limit only the strength of the forward-looking duty
to prevent cyberterrorist acts. Defining the cyberact as "terrorist" must take
place before the duty to respond to cyberterrorist acts arises, meaning that states
cannot circumvent this backward-looking duty through semantics. This duty to
respond, once triggered, has two implications for all states: they must cooperate
with criminal investigations by providing evidence, and they must bring to
justice alleged cyberterrorist actors by arresting them and either prosecuting or
extraditing them. Thankfully, states have already accepted these implications in
similar situations, so the recognition of this duty should not further overburden
states.
A. Security Council Resolution 1373 Should Apply to
Cyberterrorist Acts
The Security Council passed its wide-ranging Resolution 1373 only a few
weeks after September 11. Because the Resolution contains the word " [ajeddes,"
it obligates all 192 UN member states to carry out the Security Council's
"decisions" announced therein. Thus, Resolution 1373 creates binding
international law.76
What decisions, then, did the Security Council express in the Resolution?
Section II.C provides the most pertinent decisions verbatim, but it is worth
recapping them here. All states have an ongoing duty: 1) to try to prevent
terrorist acts, in part by sharing information with other states, 2) to prevent their
territories from harboring anyone associated with terrorist acts, 3) to prevent

75

76

Financial Times at 7 (cited in note 50) ("US government cyber experts suspect the attacks [on the
White House] were sponsored by the Chinese government, although they cannot say for sure.").
Consider Derek Jinks, State Responsibiliyfor the Acts of Private Armed Groups, 4 Chi J Ind L 83, 90
(2003) (observing a relaxation of the strict attribution standard in favor of an emerging
proscription of harboring or supporting terrorists).
See notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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their territories from being used for committing terrorist acts, and 4) to ensure
their domestic laws sufficiently criminalize and punish terrorist acts.7 But that is
not all. If this fails to prevent terrorist acts, then all states must: 1) aid in bringing
any participants to justice, and 2) do their utmost to help the investigations and
8
criminal proceedings, including helping to obtain evidence in their jurisdiction.
These two duties comprise, respectively, the duty to prevent and the duty to
respond.
It should be readily apparent when looking at Resolution 1373 that the
threshold question, at least in theory, becomes what acts should be termed
"terrorist." Thirteen instruments list distinct acts that are automatically
considered "terrorist" by the international community, but the response to
September 11 showed that the Security Council and the world do not need to
rely upon such instruments to label extreme attacks as "terrorist." Instead, they
can apply this label the very next day in radical, previously unseen
circumstances. 79 As a result, this Comment assumes that no definitional problem
will exist after a truly egregious terrorist attack, including a novel cyberterrorist
attack.8° That is, a cyberterrorist act will be deemed a "terrorist act" in the most
extreme cases.
Although Resolution 1373 does not address cyberterrorism, it should be
interpreted to encompass cyberterrorist acts. It is no accident that, out of the
almost two thousand Security Council resolutions, 8' Resolution 1373 is "one of
the most strongly worded resolutions in the history of the Security Council." 82 A
quick look at the excerpted portion in Section II.C should confirm that its
language is both strong enough and broad enough to establish a state's duty vis-vis cyberterrorist acts.8 3 This should prove uncontroversial, especially if any
definitional issue is set aside. It should be recognized that states have an
international law duty to prevent or respond to cyberterrorist acts, when they are
identified as such.

77 See Resolution 1373 at

2(b)-(e) (cited in note 30).

78

See id at

79

See Sections II.B-II.C (discussing these international agreements and the international response

80

on September 12, 2001).
See Section III.A (announcing this assumption).

81

Through October 2009, the Security Council had passed 1893 resolutions. See UN Security

82

Council, Resolutions 2008, online at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc-resolutions09.htm
Nov 21, 2009) (listing the 1893rd Security Council resolution).
Conte, Secrity in the 21st Centugy at 23 (cited in note 29).

83

See note 30 and accompanying text (providing a significant portion of this impressive resolution).
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B. Reasonable Implications for All States
This duty, once recognized, holds a handful of reasonable implications for
all 192 UN member states. But much as the duty itself is divisible into two
categories-the duty to prevent and the duty to respond-the real-world
implications also divide into two types of varying strength. The duty to prevent
is a permanent obligation but, because states can reasonably diverge on what
future acts will be "cyberterrorist" and so can circumvent the spirit of the duty,
it is also a weak duty. Conversely, the duty to respond arises only after an
egregious cyberact has already been deemed "cyberterrorist." This duty may arise
only occasionally, but it is relatively strong because no definitional
circumvention is possible. Table 1 illustrates this dichotomy.
The duty to prevent is a permanent duty, so all states always have the
obligation to: 1) try to prevent cyberterrorist acts, 2) prevent their territories
from harboring cyberterrorist associates, 3) prevent their territories from being
used as launching pads for cyberterrorist acts, and 4) ensure their domestic laws
adequately criminalize and punish cyberterrorist acts. These duties are forwardlooking, meaning that every state must perform them in the hopes of preventing
future cyberacts that are "terrorist" in nature.
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Type of
Duty

Duty to
Prevent

When Is the
Duty
Created?

Immediately

After a
cyberattack
Duty to
Respond

has occurred,
and after it
has been
deemed a
"terrorist act"

Duties

How Is
"Cyberterrorist
Act" Defined?

1. Try to prevent
cyberterrorist acts, in
part by sharing
information
2. Prevent territories
from harboring
associates of

Each individual
state considers any
reasonable
definition it wishes

cyberterrorist acts
3. Prevent territories
from being used to

to apply to future
cyberattacks
States have

commit
cyberterrorist acts
4. Ensure domestic
laws sufficiently
criminalize and
punish cyberterrorist
acts
1. Help bring to
justice any
cyberterrorist actors

significant wiggle
room to define
according to their
interests

2. Do whatever is
necessary to aid
criminal
investigations and
proceedings,

already defined a
cyberattack as a
"terrorist act" -5
States have no
wiggle room to
define according to
their interests

including securing
evidence

Relative
Strength
of Duty

Weak, but
P-Werant

The Security
Council and/or
international
community has
Strong, but
Sporadic

Table 1: A State's Duty to Prevent and Respond to Cyberterrorist Acts

Cyberacts, though, do not fall clearly under one of the thirteen conventions
proscribing terrorist acts, so a "cyberterrorist act" must be determined on an ad
hoc basis. This makes it impossible to classify in advance what specific acts will
qualify as "cyberterrorist." Every state, therefore, enjoys significant wiggle room
to adopt a definition of "cyberterrorist act" that best suits its interests, so long as
the definition is reasonable. For example, states with strong tourist economies
might focus on the cybertargeting of tourists, states with stock markets could
fret about a cybercrash, and states with limited resources may focus on even
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more limited notions of "cyberterrorist acts." This might lead to a patchwork of
domestic laws and preventative measures aimed at curtailing varying ideas of asyet-unseen "cyberterrorist acts." Despite the duty to prevent cyberterrorist acts,
we should not expect states to implement it in a way that palpably improves
world prevention.
If the duty to prevent is permanent, forward-looking, and weak, then the
duty to respond is sporadic, backward-looking, and strong. This latter duty
entails: 1) helping bring to justice any cyberterrorist actors, and 2) aiding criminal
investigations and proceedings by securing evidence and other means.
Significantly, the duty to respond materializes only after a "cyberterrorist
act" has occurred. This happens when there is a cyberattack and when it is
universally identified as a "terrorist act." Recall that, in the most extreme
cyberattacks, this identification will presumably take place almost immediately,
much like the next-day response to September 11. Once identified as such, this
cyberterrorist act triggers the duty of all states to respond to it. Because the act
has already been defined as "cyberterrorist," states can no longer quibble over
the definition, and thus cannot avoid their duty through semantics. The duty to
respond may arise sporadically but, once it does, states cannot minimize its
importance.
1. States must cooperate with criminal investigations by providing
evidence.
Most importantly, the duty to respond sets up a regime where all states
must cooperate with criminal investigations and proceedings by providing
relevant evidence. This duty to cooperate comes from Resolution 1373's
decision "that all States shall ... [a]fford one another the greatest measure of
assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings
relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in
obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings. ' 4 So the
Brobdingnags of the world (and every other state) must do everything they can
to help the Lilliputian investigation into the cyberterrorist act it suffered. Lilliput,
in Section III.B, needed to inspect data on the server located in Brobdingnag's
jurisdiction."5 Brobdingnag must do its utmost to aid in this inspection, which

84

See Resolution 1373 at

2(f) (cited in note 30) (emphasis added) (announcing this duty).

85

See notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing why this inspection will help Lilliput deduce
the server's activities and user IP addresses necessary to identify the perpetrators' location and,
hopefully, the perpetrators). This example assumed, for ease of argument, that Lilliput
encountered no problem tracing data from its own computer network to Brobdingnag's server
through various intermediate routers. See note 48 and accompanying text. Even if these
intermediate routers are located in states hostile to Lilliput, those states have the same duty to
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includes securing the network's time-sensitive evidence and providing it to the
investigators.
This obligation to cooperate enjoys significant overlap with the
Convention on Cybercrime, making the obligation appear especially workable.
Section III.B introduced this Convention as a multilateral treaty with forty-six
state signatories that have already agreed to the Convention's terms.86 Chief
among those terms is a "general principle" that all signatories must "afford one
another mutual assistance to the widest extent possible for the purpose of
investigations or [criminal proceedings] ... or for the collection of evidence in
electronic form of a criminal offense." 7 This language tracks that of Resolution
1373,88 and the sheer fact that so many states have voluntarily agreed to this
principle speaks to its feasibility. Of course, the Convention specifies other
terms, such as telling states how to request the preservation of data, and
requiring states to set up an always-available point of contact.89 These additional
terms have no explicit corollary to the wide-ranging international law obligation
recognized here, but they might provide useful guidance for determining
whether states have fulfilled their international law duty to offer "the greatest
measure of assistance" required by Resolution 1373.
2. States must arrest, and prosecute or extradite, accused cyberterrorist
actors.
The duty to respond also obliges states to arrest, and prosecute or extradite
for prosecution, anyone accused of being associated with a cyberterrorist act.
Resolution 1373 compels all states to "ensure that any person who participates
in [or supports] ... terrorist acts is brought tojuslice."' 90 Although Resolution 1373
does not define "brought to justice," other Security Council resolutions equate it

86

respond to a cyberterrorist act, and so would have to cooperate in Lilliput's investigation by
securing and providing relevant evidence on the intermediate routers.
See notes 58-59 and accompanying text (describing the Convention on Cybercrime as a shining

87

example of international cooperation aimed at combating an early and continuing species of
cyberattacks).
Convention on Cybercrime, Art 25(1) (cited in note 58).

88

This is unsurprising, given that the Convention on Cybercrime adopted this language less than
two months after the Security Council passed Resolution 1373. Compare Council of Europe,
Convention on Cyberaime (cited in note 59) (showing the Convention was first opened for signature
on November 23, 2001), with Resolution 1373 (cited in note 30) (Sept 28, 2001).

89

Convention on Cybercime (cited in note 58), Arts 29-30 (establishing the procedure to request
the preservation of data), Art 35 (requiring states to designate a point of contact that will be
available at all times).
See Resolution 1373 at 2(e) (cited in note 30) (emphasis added) (announcing this duty).
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with "the principle to extradite or prosecute."9 This means that the arresting
state can either prosecute the alleged cyberterrorist actor in its own courts, or it
can extradite him or her for prosecution elsewhere. Because Resolution 1373
also commands states to establish terrorist acts "as serious criminal offences in
domestic laws ...[so] that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such
terrorist acts,"92 the arresting state should meet its duty to "bring to justice"
accused cyberterrorist actors regardless of whether it opts to prosecute or
extradite them.
This regime is already commonplace in international law concerning
terrorist acts, so it should prove just as workable in relation to cyberterrorist
acts. Of the thirteen UN-recognized instruments defining "terrorist acts," most
"obligate all member states to make the offense a crime under their domestic
law, and impose a try-or-extradite obligation on all states with respect to persons
found in their territory alleged to have committed the offense."93 This duty to
arrest, and extradite or prosecute, accused cyberterrorist actors is no different,
and therefore should prove just as reasonable as other agreed-upon duties.
V. CONCLUSION
Cyberterrorism, in all forms, appears ready to pose an acute problem for
the future. As society continues its globalization process, it will rely ever more
upon networked systems, and this technology will become ever more accessible
to hostile individuals. To the extent that cyberterrorists commit cross-border
attacks, international law will be at the forefront of responding to
cyberterrorism.
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Resolution 1566, UN Security Council, 5053d mtg (Oct 8, 2004), UN Doc S/RES/1566 at
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(calling upon all states "to find, deny safe haven and bring to justice, on the basis of the principle
to extradite or prosecute" anyone participating or attempting to participate in terrorist acts);
Resolution 1456, UN Security Council, 4688th mtg (Jan 20, 2003), UN Doc S/RES/1456 Annex
at 3 ("States must bring to justice those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts or
provide safe havens, in accordance with international law, in particular on the basis of the
principle to extradite or prosecute."). The Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee wrote a
report that, confusingly, interprets Resolution 1373 to require states to try alleged terrorists, while
also observing that states would be competent to try or extradite them. See Report by the Chairof the
Counter-Terrorism Committee on the Problems Encounteredin the Implementation of Security CouncilResolution
1373 (2001) 6 ("[Resolution 1373] obliges States to prosecute and try all those responsible for acts
of terrorism, wherever they are committed. This measure is designed to ensure that terrorists have
no place of refuge, since each State will be competent to try them or extradite them."), annexed to
Note by the Presidentof the Security Council, UN Security Council (Jan26, 2004), UN Doc S/2004/70.
This Comment opts to follow the more persuasive interpretation given by the Security Council.
See Resolution 1373 at 2(e) (cited in note 30) (announcing this duty as well).
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Carter, Trimble, and Weiner, International Law at 1172 (cited in note 7) (discussing the
international consensus when it comes to specific acts of terror and what must be done to punish
their perpetrators).
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Sharing this forefront will be state cooperation. In an ideal world, all states
would simply agree to prevent or respond to cyberterrorist acts. But then again,
in an ideal world, we might not need law at all. For now, the best option we have
is to recognize that Security Council Resolution 1373 has created an
international law duty that requires all states to prevent and respond to
cyberterrorist acts.
Recognizing this duty will, at first, cause few real-world changes. This is
because the duty to prevent is relatively flexible, owing to states' abilities to
define "cyberterrorist act" to meet their varied interests. But once the world
suffers its first cyberattack that is so horrific it provokes universal identification
as a "terrorist act," we should expect the duty to respond to play a crucial role in
international law. Recognition of this duty is a prerequisite for applying it in such
dire circumstances.
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